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Investment incentives rank among the most important policy instruments governments employ to inﬂuence the locational 
decisions of multinational ﬁrms. In the wake of the recent increase in locational competition and the growing impact of investment 
incentives and support measures for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the need for enhanced disciplines on investment incentives 
has gained political and academic salience. This think piece explores the evolution of investment incentives from a development 
and rule-making perspective. It summarises the existing literature and examines current practices and recent trends in FDI ﬂows 
and the use of various investment incentives. This is followed by a discussion of the reasons for the observed stalemate in attempts 
at disciplinary rule-making. The paper concludes by putting forth recommendations for data gathering and transparency that could 
further the move toward improved global governance founded on the increasing complementarities of trade, investment, and 
competition law and policy as the core pillars of a more open, inclusive, and just world economy.
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1The rise of geographically dispersed production networks 
and value chains has  greatly increased both the scope and 
intensity of locational competition over so-called efﬁciency-
seeking foreign direct investment (FDI),1 by far the most 
footloose of all types of FDI and most likely to respond to a 
proliferating set of investment incentives.  
Investment incentives rank among the most important 
policy instruments governments employ to inﬂuence the 
locational decisions of multinational ﬁrms. An increasing (if 
somewhat contradictory) body of empirical evidence devoted 
to incentives recalls both their potency as tools of economic 
diversiﬁcation and competitiveness alongside the potential 
they hold to distort the allocation of trade and investment 
that would prevail in their absence and thus their capacity to 
tilt competitive conditions in the markets in which they are at 
play. 
While a number of mostly weak and indirect disciplines 
regulating the use of investment incentives can be found in 
various international instruments, host country governments 
have to date shown little political appetite for deepened rule-
making in this area, revealing instead a recurring collective 
preference for preserving the policy space that may be 
needed to direct incentives at multinational investors and 
outbid competitors (at times within the same federal state) 
in fostering cross-border investment activity. Still, the 
political and academic debate on the possible need for new 
or enhanced disciplines on investment incentives retains — 
indeed has arguably gained — salience. It has done so in the 
light of an increase in locational competition fuelled byglobal 
value chains (GVCs) that puts some countries (typically poorer 
developing states) at a distinct disadvantage in the race for 
efﬁciency-seeking FDI, but also as a result of the growing 
impact exerted by home country incentives and support 
measures bestowed on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as 
major new actors in outward FDI activity.
This think piece explores the evolution of investment 
incentives from a development and rule-making perspective. 
Section 2 provides a deﬁnition of investment incentives and 
details current practices, setting the context that frames 
the ensuing analysis. Section 3 reviews recent trends in FDI 
ﬂows and what we know of the use of investment incentives. 
Section 4 summarises the existing literature and case 
studies on the effectiveness of investment incentives. This 
is followed in Section 5 by an overview of existing disciplines 
on investment incentives and a discussion of the reasons 
for the observed stalemate in attempts at disciplinary rule-
making. Section 6 concludes by advancing a set of policy 
recommendations on disciplining investment incentives.
INTRODUCTION
Efﬁciency-seeking investment occurs where investors seek to increase 
the cost efﬁciency of production by taking advantage of factors that 
improve ﬁrm-level competitiveness. These include, inter alia, lower labour 
costs or higher labour productivity, easier or even preferential access to 
export markets, access to key inputs and components, and more efﬁcient 
international production and supply patterns. Efﬁciency-seeking investment 
is among the most difﬁcult to attract and retain, not least because so 
many factors must align to make the host country an appropriate venue 
for a particular production process at a particular moment. Countries 
tend to compete aggressively for this type of investment. A key element 
in attracting such investment is the quality and cost competitiveness 
of a country’s service infrastructure, from the “hardware” of physical 
infrastructure allowing goods and services to reach export markets 
efﬁciently and reliably to the “software” of skills and human capital 
required to upgrade to higher-value segments of supply chains. 
1
In competing to attract foreign investors, countries typically 
rely on two sets of policy instruments: investment promotion 
and investment incentives. The former generally refers to the 
activities carried out by investment promotion institutions 
(IPIs) to increase a country’s visibility in the eyes of potential 
foreign investors and raise awareness about investment 
opportunities and prevailing regulatory and doing business 
conditions in the host state (Echandi, 2015, p. 6). With respect 
to the latter, although no universally agreed deﬁnition of 
investment incentives exists, the term most commonly refers 
to “non-market beneﬁts that are conferred by a national, 
regional, or local governmental entity to economic actors 
with the purpose of inﬂuencing their investment decisions” 
(James, 2009). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) offers a variation on the above 
with the following hybrid deﬁnition of investment incentives: 
“measures designed to inﬂuence the size, location, or industry 
of an FDI investment project by affecting its relative cost or 
by altering the risks attached to it through inducements that 
are not available to comparable domestic investors”(OECD, 
2003).
While investment incentives are primarily associated with 
attracting inward FDI, they can also target outward FDI 
activity. The latter is usually promoted through direct 
measures, such as ﬁnancial, ﬁscal, information, and other 
support services, although governments do not disregard 
other indirect forms of support, such as trade-related (export 
credits), investment guarantees, or development assistance 
policies. 
Incentives granted to attract inward FDI generally aim at 
improving the host country economy by means of knowledge 
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access to markets. Outward FDI incentives tend to be more 
concerned with strengthening the competitive position of 
the parent (home country) company vis-à-vis international 
competitors from other countries in the host country (Sauvant 
et al., 2014).
Tax incentives, which are prevalent in many parts of the 
developing world and in transition economies, represent the 
most common type of incentive used to attract FDI. These 
chieﬂy take the form of foregone ﬁscal revenue. Indeed, the 
most frequent modalities of ﬁscal incentives impinge on 
income tax — exempted income, tax rebates, tax holidays and 
special corporate tax deductions; value added tax (VAT) —VAT 
zero rated goods, VAT exemption and remission; and customs 
duties — duty exemption and duty remission (Echandi, 2015). 
While less prevalent, countries with deeper pockets, both 
within and outside the OECD area, combine tax-related 
incentives with regulatory measures and ﬁnancial incentives. 
These typically involve a direct transfer of funds to targeted 
enterprises, the provision of goods and services, the building 
of production infrastructures, as well as various payments-in-
kind, for instance to cover worker training schemes (UNCTAD 
2014). 
Job creation is typically the most important objective of 
governments designing investment incentives directed at 
inward foreign investment activity, followed by technological 
upgrading, the promotion of exports and the creation of 
backward and forward linkages, all of which are increasingly 
associated with efﬁciency-seeking FDI (UNCTAD 2014).
Given that investment incentives can take various forms, 
spanning ﬁscal, ﬁnancial, regulatory, technical, or business 
support  (Johnson, Lise and Perrine Toledano, 2013), they can 
also be classiﬁed according to whether they are: 
(a) direct or indirect;
(b) ﬁnancial or implicit;
(c) general or sector/industry/ﬁrm-speciﬁc;
(d) unconditional or contingent; and 
(e) incremental or non-incremental (OECD, 1996). 
An alternative classiﬁcation of investment incentives 
distinguishes between rules-based approaches and speciﬁc 
approaches. In so doing, it builds on the type of method used 
by governments to implement investment incentives, i.e., 
discrimination of investors stipulated by law, in the former 
case, and incentives tailored to individual foreign investors or 
investment contexts, in the latter case (OECD, 2003). 
In addition to the above categorisations, investment incentives 
can be distinguished as comprising targeted competition 
incentives, which reﬂect the desire of host country (region) 
authorities to outbid the incentives provided by other 
jurisdictions to attract individual FDI projects, as well as regime 
competition incentives, which refer to the overall system 
of incentives put in place by a host country government to 
compete with the practices of other jurisdictions (OECD, 
2003).
From the vantage point of their objectives, investment 
incentives can be further distinguished into two distinct 
categories: 
(a) locational incentives aimed at inﬂuencing investors’ 
decisions on where to locate; and 
(b) behavioural incentives aimed at inducing investors to 
engage in certain desired conduct in the light of speciﬁc 
policy goals — creating linkages with local suppliers, 
fostering research and development (R&D) and 
innovation, job creation, or enhancing indigenous human 
capital (Echandi, 2015).
Investment incentive programmes are often designed in 
a horizontal (cross-sectoral) manner to raise the overall 
attractiveness of the economy. But, governments may also 
implement targeted incentives that are more limited in scope. 
These include sector-speciﬁc incentives that are predominantly 
directed toward ﬁrms operating in services industries, with 
information technology (IT), business services, and tourism 
ranking among the most frequent beneﬁciaries (UNCTAD, 
2014).
With continued strong growth of FDI directed toward service 
industries, the policy actions adopted by governments 
with a view to liberalising markets, promoting investments, 
privatising sectors, and implementing facilitation (investment 
climate enhancing) measures take centre stage. 
Of all the policy tools available to governments concerned by 
investment climate dynamics, and in response to heightened 
locational competition within and across borders, the past 
decade has witnessed a marked rise in the use of investment 
incentives. To some extent, this proliferation can be traced 
to the absence of international rules disciplining their use, 
particularly in service industries. UNCTAD reports that during 
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incentive programmes in the total number of liberalisation, 
promotion, and facilitation measures more than doubled, 
rising from 26 to 55 percent of observed yearly changes in host 
country investment measures (UNCTAD, 2014).
Although investment-related incentive policies have tended 
to proliferate in all corners of the world, over the past decade, 
such policies have been used most intensively by countries in 
Asia and Africa. According to the Asian Development Bank, 
the investment incentives used by Asian host economies 
are chieﬂy targeted in character and often relate to the 
establishment of special economic zones — in part to bypass 
the prohibition of tax incentives for exporters established 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) subsidy rules. Asian 
incentive programmes often pursue a speciﬁc approach, with 
incentives resulting from discretionary deals between host 
country governments and multinational investors (Johnson 
and Toledano, 2013). 
A 2011 African Investor Report carried out by the United 
Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) on 
the use of investment incentives in 19 sub-Saharan countries 
revealed the pervasiveness of tax-based incentives in extractive 
industries, followed by non-ﬁscal and non-ﬁnancial incentives 
(UNIDO, 2011).
With respect to outward FDI, government support in the form 
of institutionalised home country policies is a more recent 
phenomenon, concentrated chieﬂy in emerging markets 
where ﬁrms have come of age as global players over the past 
decade. It is thus not altogether surprising that the current 
institutional structure concerning incentives for outward FDI 
remains quite fragmented and embryonic in these countries — 
though one could largely say the same of developed country 
settings (Sauvant et al., 2014). Interestingly, outward FDI 
promotion services often accompany trade and inward FDI 
promotion services.
Although there is growing concern about the increasing 
control of outward FDI stock by SOEs, home country support 
of various forms are often granted to both SOEs and private 
companies regardless of the ownership structure of supported 
entities, as exempliﬁed by the 2012 joint decision of the 
Chinese National Development and Reform Commission 
and the Ministry of Finance to treat SOEs and private ﬁrms 
equally with respect to  the disbursement of public funds 
(Sauvant et al., 2014). The same appears to hold true of the 
granting of outward investment incentives of a ﬁscal nature by 
developed and emerging economies, which neithergenerally 
appear conditioned on ownership characteristics nor linked 
to considerations, such as company size, sector of economic 
activity, or FDI destination (Sauvant et al., 2014). 
Moreover, issues of competitive neutrality (a playing ﬁeld 
where no business is advantaged or disadvantaged based 
solely on ownership or nationality considerations) may arise 
also in a context where ownership considerations are not as 
relevant as they once were. Indeed, competitive neutrality 
may be distorted when home country private ﬁrms enjoy 
government support to establish afﬁliates abroad, thus placing 
them in a more advantageous position than fellow competitors 
from other countries that have not been granted any incentive 
from their own governments as well as other private ﬁrms 
in the home country that do not enjoy similar government 
support (Sauvant et al., 2014). Still, the existence of de jure 
non-discriminatory rules on outward investment incentives 
does not necessarily exclude de facto discrimination, as SOEs 
may receive other indirect advantages that are not afforded to 
non-SOEs entities, thus tilting competitive conditions in the 
recipient country in their favour.
Given the increasing use of investment incentives by countries 
across all geographical regions and income levels, asking 
whether such policy instruments are effective seems a rather 
legitimate question. Are such measures inefﬁcient when they 
encourage production to move to a suboptimal location for 
the manufacturing of goods or the supply of services? Does 
their use allow for the effective correction of market failures? 
Can investment incentives be shown to produce positive 
externalities, such as the transfer of knowledge or the creation 
of durable linkages with local suppliers? Do incentives result 
in a misallocation of public funds and prompt beggar-thy-
neighbour responses? 
A cursory review of the available literature suggests that 
the answer to all of the above questions would appear to be 
unequivocally — and paradoxically — afﬁrmative, making 
discussions of the efﬁcacy of investment incentives a 
decidedly contentious public policy issue.
A large volume of scholarly work has indeed been directed to 
studying investment incentives and their effects on economic 
growth, technology deepening, and locational decisions from 
a variety of angles. For instance, recent studies carried out by 
James (2013), Tuomi (2012), and Miroslava (2013) focused 
on the analysis of a single country or a speciﬁc subset of 
economies. Others, such as Klemm and Van Parys (2011), 
zeroed in on a single type of instrument (tax incentives) 
while others (Jenner, Groba, and Indvik, 2013), explored the 
effectiveness of investment incentives in a distinct sector 
(renewable energy). While several studies have dealt mainly 
with the political economy aspects of investment incentives, 
others have chieﬂy looked at ﬁrm behaviour. 
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Blomstrom, 2005). Increasingly popular is the view, anchored 
in a rising body of econometric evidence, documenting how 
multinational investors are becoming steadily more responsive 
to locational incentives, with competition growing between 
developed and developing country sites, and with sensitivity 
to production being particularly pronounced in export-related 
activities, i.e., over efﬁciency-seeking FDI embodying the GVC 
phenomenon2 (Mutti, 2003; Altshuler, Grubert and Newlong, 
2001; Moran, Graham and Blomstrom, 2005). The above 
trends ﬁnd a parallel in the marked growth observed of late 
in the number of national investment promotion agencies, in 
their rising budgets, and the increasingly sophisticated range 
of incentives they offer.   
Still, the debate rages in academic and policy circles over 
the effectiveness, sustainability, and fairness of locational 
competition in a world characterised by increasingly footloose 
cross-border investment activity. At one (negative) extreme 
of the analytical spectrum lies James (2013), who asserts 
that investment incentives produce little by way of FDI 
additionality, arguing that governments should primarily 
concentrate on their policy fundamentals and improve 
their investment climate, which is crucial for FDI-attracting 
purposes. Such a view is echoed in a literature survey on 
incentives and the locational decisions of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) carried out by Johnson and Toledano 
(2013), which argues that, on balance, and across all categories 
of FDI (and not only efﬁciency-seeking FDI), investment 
incentives do not display a predominant role in the locational 
decisions of foreign investors. Such a conclusion was 
corroborated by UNIDO’s African Investors Report of 2011, 
which highlighted how investment incentives ranked at 
only 11 out of 12 factors that were put for consideration for 
investors’ locational decisions, while economic and political 
stability were considered to carry more weight in their 
decision-making process (UNIDO, 2011). The latter results 
are perhaps not fully surprising given the nature of FDI that 
the African continent attracts — natural resource-seeking 
FDI — for which locational incentives are arguably naturally 
wasteful (though the case for behavioural incentives may 
be signiﬁcantly stronger to promote backward and forward 
linkages in enclave economies), as well as in the light of 
the deep-seated governance challenges encountered in 
many of the continent’s host economies. Echandi (2015) 
further supports the view that, because investor decisions 
on where to locate are mainly inﬂuenced by broad economic 
and investment climate factors as well as human capital 
availability, investment incentives assume relevance only 
when investors are wavering between like options and the 
investment climate in the host state is already favourable. This 
Although the criteria used to assess the possible impacts of FDI 
incentives may vary, the ﬁnancial sustainability of the schemes 
as well as the potential misallocation of governments’ ﬁnancial 
resources rank among the most frequently cited. Indeed, the 
desirability of investment incentives as a potentially effective 
instrument to foster cross-border investment activity and the 
spillovers generally associated with them are often measured 
against the burdens they may place on a government’s 
ﬁnancial resources, a challenge widely seen as most acute 
for developing countries. Still, in order to determine the 
overall effectiveness of investment incentives, their ﬁscal 
sustainability should be assessed against the beneﬁts, 
spillovers, and other potential positive aspects they generate 
(Echandi, 2015). However, identifying the value, ultimate 
beneﬁciary, and type of investment incentives is not an easy 
task, as most of the necessary data is not readily available 
(OECD, 1996).
Still, in shedding  analytical light on the economic impact of 
investment incentives, the OECD has identiﬁed ﬁve main 
criteria to be used to measure the potentially wasteful effects 
of FDI incentives: 
(i) ineffectiveness, which results from the inability of 
investment incentives to produce enough beneﬁts to 
outweigh costs; 
(ii) inefﬁciency, which is caused by the authorities being 
unable to maximise the beneﬁts, even when they outweigh 
budgetary costs; 
(iii) opportunity costs, which occur whenever a government’s 
ﬁnancial resources are scarce and could be better allocated; 
(iv) deadweight losses, which refer to instances where 
investment incentives were not needed, failed to address 
the intended recipients, or the like; and 
(v) triggering competition, which occurs whenever an 
investment incentives regime adopted by a government 
may trigger an escalating confrontation with other 
jurisdictions based on the most generous incentive 
package, with negative consequences on the long-term 
(but also short-term) ﬁnancial sustainability of such 
schemes (OECD, 2003).
Despite an abundance of studies on the topic, the existing 
economic literature offers contrasting evidence on the 
effectiveness of investment incentives in inﬂuencing the 
decision-making process of the economic actors at which such 
incentives are directed, or in beneﬁting the host economies to 
which the investments are destined. 
What is beyond debate, however, is the fact that the past 
several decades have witnessed a signiﬁcant escalation in the 
packages of tax breaks, incentives, free land, below market-
priced ofﬁce space, subsidised training, and other subsidy 
programmes offered by both developed and developing 
countries to attract investors and/or to keep home country 
Work by Mutti (2003), cited in Moran, Graham and Blomstrom (2005), 
shows that the propensity of multinational ﬁrms to base their locational 
decisions on host country tax policy is strongest for plants producing 
manufactures for export in developing countries. Mutti estimates that tax 
measures that reduce the cost of capital by 1 percent raise multinational 
production in the manufacturing sector in host economies by 3 percent.  
2
5is particularly true for natural-resource-seeking3 and market-
seeking investors,4 who tend to be less inﬂuenced by the 
incentives offered by the host state (Echandi , 2015).
At the same time, evidence from Chinese investors concerning 
their outward FDI activities suggests that home country 
policies adopted by the Chinese government have been 
considered helpful by the majority of investors, both private 
entities and SOEs, making use of them (Sauvant et al., 2014). 
Echoing the point made above on the inﬂuence of investment 
incentives for efﬁciency-seeking FDI, Miroslava’s (2013) 
assessment of incentives granted by the Czech government 
to 30 foreign companies over the 1998-2011 period suggests 
that such support measures have proven mostly effective using 
a variety of performance metrics, although she considers that 
they might not be necessary were the government to lower 
corporate taxes and maintain greater political stability in the 
country. 
Natural resource-seeking investments, which occur when investors’ wishes 
to access resources that are located in a speciﬁc geographical location are 
strongly inﬂuenced by the conditions for gaining access to these resources 
and the investment climate in general. They usually generate large 
quantities of communities for export. See Echandi (2015).
Market-seeking investors are motivated by the desire to deliver goods and 
services in the host state, thus making them more sensitive to the size and 
characteristics of the domestic market as well as the investment policy of 
the host country. See Echandi (2015).
The Singapore Issues describes four new topics — investment, competition, 
transparency in public procurement, and trade facilitation — that were 
placed on the WTO’s agenda at the  1996 Ministerial meeting held in 
Singapore.    
For a fuller discussion of the treatment of investment-related issues in the 
WTO, see Sauvé (1994).
3
4
5
6
An examination of the political economy of rule-making in 
the area of investment, and particularly of potentially trade-, 
investment- and competition-distorting measures, such as 
investment incentives, is crucial to better grasp the scope and 
nature of existing disciplines on investment incentives, the 
impact recent developments in global trade and investment 
(the rise of GVCs) exert on the nature and intensity of 
cross-border locational competition, and on prospects for 
developing new disciplines in the area. 
The idea of establishing an international investment regime, 
which initially arose in the late 1940s during negotiations of 
the Havana Charter on the creation of the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), was not taken up seriously again until an 
attempt was made in the late 1990s to conclude an OECD-
anchored Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). The 
MAI’s desultory outcome shifted the focus of international 
discussions on investment-related matters to the WTO and 
the so-called Singapore Issues,5 whose equally desultory fate 
was sealed at the 2004 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, 
when negotiators agreed to drop three of the four Singapore 
issues, among which investment, from the ongoing Doha 
Round’s agenda. This has meant, in practice, that bilateral 
investment treaties and preferential trade agreements 
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featuring comprehensive investment disciplines have become 
the preferred (indeed only) routes for advances on rule-making 
and liberalisation on the investment front. 
The stillborn nature of multilateral discussions on investment 
does not, however, connote a complete absence of 
international disciplines. Such rules do exist, though they 
are scattered across a variety of WTO instruments rather 
than found in one coherent whole.6 The tale of the missing 
multilateral regime for investment remains a paradox in a 
world economy where FDI, more than (but complementary to) 
trade, is the leading vector of cross-border integration.
More speciﬁcally, the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCM) and the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs), both of which prohibit 
subsidies and local content requirements made contingent on 
the grant of an incentive; the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS); as well as the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) all include 
provisions which, directly or indirectly, feature elements of 
an international regime on investment. For example, Mode 
3 (commercial presence) of the GATS anchors a process of 
progressive liberalisation of investment measures in a sector 
that accounts for some two-thirds of aggregate FDI ﬂows 
and an estimated four of ﬁve investment barriers (Sauvé, 
Molinuevo, and Tuerk, 2006). 
In addition to the multilateral disciplines described above, 
the past two decades have witnessed a spectacular rise in the 
number of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs) featuring extensive disciplines on 
investment protection and liberalisation. While the majority of 
BITs are more concerned with matters of post-establishment 
investment protection, PTAs feature comprehensive 
investment norms focused on both protection and 
liberalisation issues, and are typically aimed at creating a more 
favourable investment climate that would be conducive to 
increased ﬂows of investment among parties and non-parties 
(when liberal rules of origin toward third-country investors 
are adopted). PTAs tend to make greater use of instruments 
like exceptions, transition periods, and reservations to ensure 
ﬂexibility in liberalisation obligations. 
6More frequent recourse to preferential routes to investment 
rule-making can be attributed to a number of factors, among 
which the stalling of multilateral negotiations under the Doha 
Development Agenda (and the rejection of investment on the 
menu of the Singapore Issues) as well as political economy 
considerations arising from recent developments in the world 
economy, notably the relative decline of Western hegemons 
—the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) — 
and the concomitant rise, including as signiﬁcant FDI source 
countries, of a growing number of emerging powers seeking 
their place in an evolving global governance architecture. 
A quick perusal of agreements covered by the WTO’s regional 
trade agreement (RTA) database shows that more than 100 
such agreements address investment-related issues either 
through the inclusion of a speciﬁc chapter on investment 
or by reference to investment-related matters in speciﬁc 
provisions. Moreover, all of the most recent mega-regional 
trade agreements under negotiation (or recently concluded) 
around the world feature extensive investment-related 
provisions in dedicated chapters. This includes the Canada-EU 
Comprehensive Trade Agreement, Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership 
between the US and a number of Paciﬁc Rim countries, the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between 
the US and the EU, the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership Agreement linking ASEAN countries to six regional 
partners, among which China and India, the Paciﬁc Alliance 
linking four like-minded Latin American economies,7 as well 
as the Tripartite Agreement linking three of Africa’s largest 
regional integration schemes.
An important observation concerning the above mosaic of 
investment rule-making is that, with very few exceptions 
(the principal being the EU’s state aid doctrine in the context 
of its single market8), virtually all existing (and proposed) 
treaty instruments eschew legally binding disciplines on 
the potentially distortive effects of investment incentives. 
Indeed, although International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
and multilateral agreements do address, to some extent, 
investment-distorting measures —for example, the TRIMS 
Agreement prohibits a number of performance requirements 
found in breach of GATT Articles II.4 (National Treatment) 
and XI (Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions) — none 
of them feature disciplines targeted speciﬁcally at the use 
of investment incentives (OECD, 1996). Whether under 
the GATS negotiations (in Article XV), the failed MAI, the 
subsequent WTO Working Group on the Relationship between 
trade and Investment, or the thousands of BITs and hundreds 
of PTAs, host countries — both developed and developing 
— have repeatedly and steadfastly expressed a collective 
preference for regulatory inaction and the preservation of 
policy immunity with respect to investment-related subsidy 
practices. Accordingly, neither the WTO nor IIAs currently 
feature a credible set of disciplines on the distortive effects of 
investment incentives.
Such regulatory inaction is somewhat paradoxical, as the 
uninterrupted escalation of what Moran, Graham, and 
Blomstrom (2005) call “revenue giveaways” arguably makes 
the need for collective action more pressing. Developed and 
developing countries alike, and particularly the latter, share 
a common interest in generating greater public awareness 
(transparency) on incentive practices and to control and 
possibly cap tax breaks and locational incentives on an 
international basis. Yet precisely the reverse of international 
cooperation has occurred. Several reasons can be adduced in 
explaining such an outcome, most of which are of a political 
economy nature. Two in particular warrant closer attention: 
(i) the renewed buoyancy of the “market” for the preservation 
of policy space, itself a reﬂection of a rehabilitation of sorts 
for support for more activist forms of industrial policy; and (ii) 
the proclivity in investment policy to discriminate in favour of 
foreign economic agents. 
With reference to the former, the absence of a political 
appetite for disciplining investment incentives reﬂects without 
doubt the willingness of host country governments to preserve 
their policy space for purposes of FDI attraction and retention. 
This is true despite conﬂicting evidence on the economic 
efﬁcacy of incentive programmes in fostering FDI and the 
persistent voicing of concerns directed toward the possible 
misallocation of public funds such incentives represent. 
The repeated conduct of host country governments suggests 
beyond reasonable doubt their greater concern with 
being able to “play the game” in a world where locational 
competition over participation in global and regional value 
chains has become increasingly ﬁerce, leaving smaller and/
or geographically more remote countries (or regions within 
countries) vulnerable to information asymmetries and other 
market failures that justify recourse to more activist forms of 
industry support.   
Regulatory inaction also proceeds from the peculiar political 
economy of investment attraction, which often necessitates 
host country governments to extend to foreign investors 
privileges not available to domestic investors. Such “better 
than national treatment” outcomes create an alliance between 
host countries and foreign investors that militate against 
stringent disciplines toward likely distorting practices.9  
The lack of substantive disciplines governing the use of 
patently distortive industry support measures encourages 
host country governments to rely on these types of policy 
instruments to the detriment of alternative measures. 
Investment incentives might well be suboptimal instruments 
or second-best options resorted to by governments because 
their use is weakly constrained by international law rather than 
The member countries of the Paciﬁc Alliance are Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Peru.
One should not, however, underestimate the political pressure that 
some domestic constituencies can exert on home country governments, 
especially those that may feel threatened by FDI-induced market entry by 
foreign investors.
See Sauvé and Soprana (2015) for a fuller discussion of the EU’s state aid 
doctrine.
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7because they represent the best policy tools to apply to attract 
and retain FDI.  
The recent escalation of investment incentives does raise 
legitimate “beggar-thy-neighbour” or “race-to-the-bottom” 
concerns when looked at from a world welfare perspective. 
Indeed, if a government offers generous tax incentives to 
foreign investors to (re-)locate their production or commercial 
presence in its territory, that host country’s quest to attract 
foreign investments, with a view to creating jobs, transferring 
knowledge, and increasing the overall welfare of its citizens, 
may prompt other governments to outbid it by offering 
even more generous incentive packages, thus triggering a 
“race-to-the-bottom” with FDI over-subsidisation as the 
main outcome. The problem, of course, is that world welfare 
considerations rarely, if ever, command enough buy-in to 
translate into effective international cooperation, all the more 
so in the mercantilistic ecosystems of trade and investment 
negotiations.  
But, over-subsidisation may not be the only key problem 
arising from the adoption of a “race-to-the-bottom” strategy. 
Bidding wars between countries to inﬂuence the ﬂow of 
investments may lead to excessive expenditures of public 
funds, which can be particularly critical for those developing 
and transition economies with limited ﬁnancial resources. 
Considering the escalating use of investment incentives, 
the lack of progress on — and, indeed, of political interest 
in — negotiations aimed at the development of disciplines 
regulating the potentially investment-distorting effects of 
investment incentives, and the unique political economy that 
shapes policy debates on the design of incentive schemes, 
prospects for signiﬁcant forward movement in this area hardly 
seem bright. For much of the past two decades, countries 
of all sizes, income levels, and political persuasions have 
reafﬁrmed a clear preference for preserving their policy space 
and shown little interest in negotiating rules that may erode it, 
even when the main object of agreed disciplines is to promote 
the use of economically optimal and politically fairer industry 
support measures. 
Are calls for negotiations on rules aimed at curtailing the 
distortive impacts of investment incentives a waste of time? 
Although some measure of (realistic) pessimism may well be 
justiﬁed, it may still be possible to rekindle interest in a global 
conversation on the issue in the light of a number of recent 
developments. 
For any policy initiative to garner necessary political traction, 
credible information — through carefully targeted data 
collection — is a necessary precondition. Thus, it is essential 
for leading, independent, organisations, such as the WTO, 
the World Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), or the OECD to be entrusted, 
preferably in a cooperative manner given their respective 
comparative advantages, to gather detailed information 
on the nature, sectoral incidence, and geographical scope 
of incentives and their use. Such mapping could start,, for 
example, from an overview of the use of investment incentives 
in various countries and with a quantitative assessment of 
their distortive effects on cross-border investment activity 
and distinguishing between different types of investments 
(market- versus efﬁciency-seeking) and sectors of economic 
activity (manufacturing versus services). 
Disciplining potentially investment-distorting incentives 
requires an in depth understanding of the effects these 
policy instruments exert on the countries that grant them, 
on the investors that receive them, in terms of their ability 
to inﬂuence investment ﬂows, as well as on third countries. 
Credible (enforceable) disciplines or even non-binding 
guidelines on best practices cannot gain durable traction 
in the absence of evidenced-based discussions. If more 
comprehensive data were to allow a fuller understanding of 
the factors and conditions that lead investment incentives to 
be more or less effective, countries might be more open to 
considering the possibility of distinguishing between “good” 
and “bad” incentives and devising disciplines that would 
generally limit recourse to the former and discourage the 
use of the latter. It is in this context, for example, that one 
could view the discussion on differences between locational 
and behavioural incentives. Although the former can offset 
market failures, their economic efﬁciency is highly debated, 
as they can readily divert investment away from locations that 
otherwise would have been chosen (UNCTAD, 2004). It may, 
thus, be desirable to discipline the use of locational incentives 
to neutralise any potential distortive effects or discourage 
their recurring application, even though countries have so far 
shown little interest in doing so. Behavioural incentives tend 
to be more efﬁcient to the extent that they do not necessarily 
generate outright distortive effects and can actually be 
instrumental in fostering technology transfers, generating local 
supplier spillovers, and enhancing skills development. Such 
positive effects of behavioural incentives call into question 
the desirability of new disciplines that may frustrate their use 
and, consequently, reduce the potential beneﬁts arising from 
their application. The collection of credible data would allow 
policymakers to better understand the differences, inter alia, 
between locational and behavioural incentives and evaluate 
the desirability and feasibility of disciplines targeted at the 
distortive effects arising from their application.
Another, complementarity, step concerns the need to generate 
greater transparency on investment subsidy practices through 
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both the nature of incentives used and the level of expenditure 
(or foregone ﬁscal revenue) attached to such measures. By 
promoting increased international transparency through the 
establishment of objective criteria and regular notiﬁcation 
procedures, countries would reduce the incentive to free ride 
while promoting greater accountability to domestic taxpayers. 
Gathering the hard and soft data depicted above would allow 
policymakers to better assess the costs and beneﬁts of various 
incentive schemes and, through international comparison, 
help identify possible negotiating bargains in areas of common 
concern or practice. In addition, promoting transparency 
would help reduce opportunities for corruption or undue 
administrative discretion in the granting of incentives while 
ensuring greater predictability for eligible beneﬁciaries. 
Arguably, this may seem to be a somewhat tepid approach, 
but encouraging the collection of more reliable and 
comprehensive data and promoting increased regulatory 
transparency constitute feasible starting points that need not 
prove unduly controversial among host country governments. 
There is little denying that the development of new disciplines 
targeting the potentially trade-, investment- and competition-
distortive effects of investment incentives is warranted. This is 
so, not least because existing disciplines are simply not up to 
the task and in light of new sources of distortion that the rise 
of capital-exporting SOEs enjoying signiﬁcant home country 
support can bring in their wake.  
Still, this paper’s advocacy of a more cautious data-gathering 
approach proceeds from recognition of the limited political will 
that currently prevails to move this ﬁle forward. 
Interestingly, recent developments in the EU suggest that 
scope for forward movement in this area may be achieved 
through the application of competition policy disciplines, 
rather than through trade or investment law (see Box 1). 
The question of whether and when data collection generates 
an interest in rule-making is not one that can be answered 
credibly at this stage. Were such an optimistic scenario 
to unfold, countries could be encouraged to ponder the 
development of more stringent multilateral disciplines on 
investment incentives. As the OECD pointed out, healthy 
competition through cooperation between jurisdictions and 
the implementation of enforceable rules can allow incentives 
to improve the ﬂow of investment projects — hence, 
producing local efﬁciency — while ensuring that the latter 
are matched to the locations where their value is greatest — 
thus, minimising distortions (Christiansen et al., 2003). Any 
agreed global compact on investment incentives should be 
binding enough to minimise the risk of deviation on the part of 
governments, but also ﬂexible enough to allow host countries 
confronted with market failures of vastly differing intensity to 
pursue and enact legitimate industry support measures. 
New disciplines on investment incentives could be built on a 
trafﬁc light-like approach inspired by the SCM Agreement. 
Such disciplines could usefully distinguish various types of 
incentives based on their nature or use and adopt a variable 
geometry approach to their disciplining reach, depending on 
the economic characteristics of users. 
A trafﬁc light approach may also be considered in ensuring 
that SOEs behave in a competitively neutral way in foreign 
BOX 1:
EU state aid rules and tax incentives
An October 2015 court ruling by the European Commission found that selective tax advantages provided to Fiat Trade and Finance 
in Luxembourg and Starbucks in the Netherlands were illegal under EU State Aid rules. Although the tax rulings that a country’s 
national tax authority issues to artiﬁcially lower the taxes paid by a company are legal under EU rules, the European Commission 
found that the those under investigation were based on artiﬁcial and complex methodologies with no foundation in economic 
reality and created and unfair competitive advantage over other companies, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises, 
which are taxed on their actual proﬁts under the same national systems (European Commission, 2015a). Whilst stating that 
further inquiries into tax ruling practices will be extended to all EU Member States, the European Commissioner responsible for 
competition acknowledged that fair tax competition in Europe cannot be achieved only through the enforcement of state aid 
rules and called for a combination of legislative action and competition enforcement, as well as greater transparency (European 
Commission, 2015b).
The implications of the EC ruling on investment in Europe can be far-reaching. EU Members States might be forced to review their 
investment incentive strategies, as tax rulings that are currently widely used risk being found illegal under future investigations, 
thus undermining the principle of predictability that helped lure multinationals into a country through selective tax advantages 
(Reuters, 2015). Moreover, a modiﬁcation of the investment climate in the EU may reinforce calls for corporate tax harmonization, 
and put enough pressure on politicians to engage in negotiations on disciplines on investment incentives beyond the realm of EU 
rules on state aid.
9markets. The question does arise, however, whether 
putative SOE disciplines should include speciﬁc provisions 
on investment incentives related to outward FDI, or whether 
investment incentives should rather be disciplined by a 
different set of generic provisions covering both inward 
and outward FDI and thus target all potential investors 
irrespective of their ownership structure. The former approach 
might generate an unwarranted and politically contentious 
differentiation between SOEs and private ﬁrms, even when 
in practice both can affect competitive neutrality in the 
recipient market. Considering that ﬁscal and ﬁnancial support 
to outward FDI tends to be offered on a non-discriminatory 
basis, the second approach might well prove advantageous 
by encompassing all possible types of competitive distortions 
arising from incentives. 
The ascendant use of investment incentives offers a clear 
example of a policy challenge of potentially global incidence 
that should ideally command a global governance response 
founded on the increasing complementarities of trade, 
investment, and competition law and policy as the core pillars 
of a more open, inclusive, and just world economy. 
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